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Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological 
Change? 
Lyria Bennett Moses* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
While at law school, I often found that the most 
interesting hypotheticals and research topics were based on 
some new (or once new) technology.  Examples might be taken 
from a range of technologies and doctrinal fields: e-commerce 
and contract law, electronic documents and litigation, organ 
transplantation and property law, the rise of industry and tort 
law, computer hacking and criminal law, and so forth.  My 
interest in these types of questions is not unique.  Over forty 
law journals claim to deal with issues of law and technology.1  
While some of these are limited to specific technologies or to 
particular areas of law (such as intellectual property), there 
are many that are interested in the same spectrum of issues 
as myself.  Given this scholarly focus, one might expect to find 
a group of scholars commenting on “law and technology,” in 
the same way as one finds groups of scholars looking at “law 
and economics” or “law and literature.”  The study of 
technology as such is certainly an important topic within other 
©  2007 Lyria Bennett Moses. 
*   Lyria Bennett Moses, B.Sc. (Hons), LL.B. (UNSW), LL.M. (Columbia) 
Lecturer, University of New South Wales; JSD Candidate, Columbia Law 
School. The author would like to thank Frank Pasquale, Kieran Tranter, 
Gaia Bernstein, Arthur Cockfield, Harold Edgar, Peter Strauss, Bill Sage, 
Jennifer Chandler, and Karen Eltis for their insights, as well as the peer 
reviewer and faculty and student editors at the Minnesota Journal of Law, 
Science and Technology for their helpful comments.  
 1. Search performed on Washington & Lee Law School’s Law Journal: 
Submissions and Rankings website, available at http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/ 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2007). 
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disciplines, including philosophy, history, and sociology.2  
Among legal scholars, however, interest in a general theory of 
law and technology is relatively recent.3 
The rationale for a general theory of law and technology, 
or a general theory of law and technological change, is not 
immediately obvious.4  Such a topic risks being both too broad 
and too narrow.  It appears too general because of the 
significant differences between technologies—the birth control 
pill raises very different legal questions from those raised by 
nuclear power.  At the same time, it risks reifying technology.  
Technology might also be too narrow a focus—efforts might be 
more efficiently directed at developing a more general theory, 
such as a theory of law and social change.  My goal in this 
essay is to justify a focus on “law and technological change” 
rather than any narrower or broader topic.  I begin in Part II 
by setting out a definition of technology and technological 
change.  Part III sets out some of the general observations 
that might be made about law and technological change and 
the benefits of broadening one’s analysis to look at technology 
as a category.  Part IV distinguishes a theory of law and 
technological change from even broader topics, in particular, 
law and changes in knowledge and law and social change.  
Part V concludes by setting out some of the potential 
 2. Journals addressing these issues include: Society for Philosophy and 
Technology Quarterly Electronic Journal; Bulletin of Science, Technology and 
Society; Technology and Culture. 
 3. See Gaia Bernstein, Accommodating Technological Innovation: 
Identity, Genetic Testing, and the Internet, 57 VAND. L. REV. 965 (2004) 
(comparing the impact of genetic testing and the Internet on identity 
interests, showing how similar problems arise in different settings); Gaia 
Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discrimination 
and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 243 (2006) (discussing how, where a 
technology has a negative impact on social values, certain features of a 
technology’s diffusion can create inefficient situations); Arthur Cockfield, 
Towards a Theory of Law and Technology, 30 MAN. L.J. 383 (2004) 
(evaluating different interpretive responses to technological change); David 
Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
71, 71 (2001); Monroe E. Price, The Newness of New Technology, 22 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1885, 1888 (2001).  In the field of international law, see generally 
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Law in a Shrinking World: The Interaction of Science 
and Technology with International Law, 88 KY. L.J. 809 (1999-2000) and 
Colin B. Picker, A View From 40,000 Feet: International Law and the 
Invisible Hand of Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149 (2001).  See also  
LAURENCE TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW (1972). 
 4. For discussions, see Law and Technology Theory,  
http://techtheory.blogspot.com/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2007). 
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advantages of theorizing about law and technology. 
II. WHAT IS TECHNOGICAL CHANGE? 
The term “technology” is not univocal; it has a range of 
meanings and has been employed in different ways in 
different contexts.  Its modern history is quite short.5  It has 
been used to refer to: (1) tools and techniques; (2) organized 
systems such as factories; (3) applied science; (4) those 
methods that achieve, or are intended to achieve, a particular 
goal such as efficiency, the satisfaction of human needs and 
wants, or control over the environment; and (5) the study of or 
knowledge about such things.6  The term “technology” thus 
sometimes includes what might also be called “technique”; 
making organization, bureaucracy, and even law itself into 
“technologies.”  Such extended meanings of the term 
“technology” are not, however, what law journals focused on 
“technology” usually mean by the term.7  The study of the 
“technologies” of corporate organization, government 
bureaucracy, and law tend to be left to experts in corporate 
law, administrative law, and legal theory (or law and social 
theory) respectively.  Since locating a single definition of 
technology is impossible, this essay will adopt a narrower 
focus. 
When lawyers claim to be interested in issues 
surrounding law and technology, it is usually related to 
questions of how the law ought to relate to activities, entities, 
and relationships made possible by a new technology.  As 
technology changes, we can do things, make things, and form 
connections that were not previously practicable.8  For 
 5. Eric Schatzberg, Technik Comes to America: Changing Meanings of 
Technology Before 1930, 47 TECH. & CULTURE 486 (2006). 
 6. LARRY A. HICKMAN, PHILOSOPHICAL TOOLS FOR TECHNOLOGICAL 
CULTURE PUTTING PRAGMATISM TO WORK 11 (2001); CARL MITCHAM, 
THINKING THROUGH TECHNOLOGY: THE PATH BETWEEN ENGINEERING AND 
PHILOSOPHY 116-17, 150, 160, 308 (1994). 
 7. There has, however, been some work extending the general critique 
of technology, such as, JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John 
Wilkinson trans., Vintage Books 1964) to criticize unduly technical 
approaches to law.  See also, Franz A. Foltz & Frederick A. Foltz, Technology, 
Religion and Justice: The Problems of Disembedded and Disembodied Law, 
26 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC. 463 (2006). 
 8. Of course, new forms of conduct made possible by technological 
change were always theoretically possible.  However, for practical purposes, 
they were only available after the relevant technological change. 
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example, the development of in vitro fertilization meant that: 9 
• Biologically infertile couples could bear and raise a 
genetically related child; 
• There was a new field of activity, providing in vitro 
services, that could be carried out in various ways; 
• An existing entity (the embryo) was moved to a 
new location, creating the possibility of additional 
tests and manipulations. 
As further illustration, one topic, rail transportation, gave 
rise to very different potentialities: 
• The possibility of transport by rail gave rise to an 
incentive to build tracks across land belonging to 
another. 
• The possibility also created a new field of activity, 
running a railroad network, which required 
significant investments of capital as well as 
centralized organization. 
• In the construction of railroads, new “things” were 
manufactured and used, including trains, 
carriages, and their components (brakes, couplers, 
etc.). 
• Once constructed, railroads enabled (relatively) 
rapid transportation by land but only along fixed 
routes. 
• The operation of railroads created the potential for 
new types of accidents (such as collisions of trains 
with pedestrians, vehicles, employees, and 
animals) and increased the extent of other harms 
(such as environmental damage). 
A definition that focuses on the relationship between 
technological change and new forms of conduct was offered by 
David Schön in 1967.  Schön defines technology as “any tool or 
technique, any product or process, any physical equipment or 
method of doing or making, by which human capability is 
extended.”10  This essay concentrates on technology as being 
that which overcomes physical, as opposed to legal, normative 
or self-imposed constraint. 
 9. Lyria Bennett Moses, Legal Responses to Technological Change: The 
Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 514-15 
(2005). 
 10. DONALD SCHÖN, TECHNOLOGY AND CHANGE 1 (1967); see also 
LANGDON WINNER, AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY 98, 178-79 (1977). 
MOSES L. Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological Change? MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
2007;8(2):589-606. 
2007] WHY HAVE A THEORY OF LAW & TECH. CHANGE? 593 
                                                          
The very different technologies of in vitro fertilization and 
railroad transportation can be used to illustrate the 
relationship between increases in human capacity and legal 
dilemmas.11  For example, in the case of assisted reproduction 
(including in vitro fertilization):12 
• There was a perceived need to either prohibit in 
vitro fertilization, or at least to regulate it, in order 
to respond to health, safety, and social concerns. 
• It was uncertain whether in vitro embryos would 
be treated as persons, property, or something else. 
• In most jurisdictions, there was no criminal 
penalty for “stealing” embryos, which could not be 
treated as property having a fixed value. 
• At least one case had held that a woman using the 
sperm of a man who was not her husband for the 
purposes of assisted reproduction had committed 
adultery. 
Problems that, at first glance, appear quite different arose 
from the introduction of rail travel: 
• There was a perceived need to develop special laws 
to respond to the physical dangers posed by 
railroads.13 
• The need to construct rail tracks confronted legal 
uncertainty as to whether an agreement between a 
railroad and a landowner permitting the former to 
construct and use tracks across the land of the 
latter could give rise to a proprietary right.14 
• The obligations generally imposed on common 
carriers, such as the requirement that goods be 
delivered to consignees on their own premises, 
proved impractical for railroads.15 
• The assumption that A’s right to pass through B’s 
land was intended to be personal rather than 
 11. For discussion of a broader range of technologies, see Lyria Bennett 
Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep up with Technological 
Change, (2007) U. ILL. J.L., TECH. & POL’Y (forthcoming). 
 12. Bennett Moses, supra note 9, at 522-536. 
 13. E.g., Federal Safety Appliances Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20301 (1893). 
 14. Compare Hemmingway v. Fernandes, 13 Simons. 228, 60 E.R. 89 
(1842) (covenant to erect a railway across the land of another in exchange for 
payment of a toll is proprietary) with Keppell v. Bailey, 2 My. & K. 517, 39 
E.R. 1042, 1048 (1834) (covenant to use an existing railway in exchange for 
payment of a toll not proprietary). 
 15. JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 182 (2001). 
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proprietary unless A owned property nearby made 
little sense where A was a railroad company, 
rendering the general rule against easements in 
gross obsolete.16 
By demonstrating that problems generated by the very 
different technologies of assisted reproduction and rail 
transportation arise for similar reasons, this essay will 
demonstrate the advantages of developing a theory of law and 
technological change.  Lawyers tend to break along 
technological lines (health lawyers, cyber-lawyers, etc.) or 
doctrinal lines (contract lawyers, tort lawyers, etc.).  In most 
circumstances, a specific focus is important.  No single theory 
can decide whether regulation is necessary and, if so, in what 
form, for every conceivable type of technology.  Again, the 
birth control pill raises very different issues to those raised by 
nuclear power.  No theory of law and technology will answer 
all legal questions for all technologies.  It can, however, offer 
those who work in particular areas some useful insights. 
III. ZOOMING OUT TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
Although each technological change may have very 
different impacts on both law and society, useful observations 
can be made at a more general level.  The current state of 
technology limits, in practice, what actions we can perform, 
what objects we can create, and what relationships we can 
form.  It is thus common for technological change to impact 
the law, which limits what actions we may perform, what 
objects we may create and use, and what relationships will be 
recognized.  Before something becomes possible, there is no 
need to decide how it is treated under existing legal rules or 
whether it ought to be permitted, prohibited, required, or 
encouraged.  These questions arise (with increasing urgency) 
when a new technological development is conceived, 
developed, and diffused into society. 
Although not every technology generates litigation and 
legal scholarship, technological change is often the occasion for 
legal problems.  Four reasons why legal change might be a 
necessary response to technological change are: 
1. New rules. We need to regulate certain new forms of 
conduct and new, specially tailored laws are required to do 
 16. JOHN CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 342 (2d ed. 
1975). 
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this.  In some cases, it may even be appropriate to ban a 
particular technology or particular applications of that 
technology. 
2. Uncertainty. The law is uncertain as it applies to new 
forms of conduct.  In other words, it is not clear whether 
such conduct is commanded, prohibited, or authorized.  
Existing rules need to be clarified. 
3. Scope of rules. Existing rules were not formulated with 
new technologies in mind.  Thus, some rules in their 
current form inappropriately include or exclude new forms 
of conduct. 
4. Justification for rules. Some existing rules are explicitly 
or implicitly based on a premise that no longer exists, and 
are thus no longer justified [or important or cost-
effective].17 
 
The examples of legal problems arising from the 
introduction of assisted reproduction and rail transportation 
set out in Part II above fit into these four categories.  Not 
every technology will raise issues in each of the four 
categories; some technologies, such as electric can openers, 
raise few, if any, legal issues.  Nevertheless, as technology 
changes, as new entities, activities, and relationships come 
into being, there is at least the potential for issues to arise in 
the above four categories. 
This classification scheme has several useful functions.  
Understanding the ways in which legal rules fail to achieve 
their purposes in the face of technological change can assist in 
improving techniques of legislative drafting.  Having a clearer 
understanding of how legal problems arise in the face of 
technological change can help in creating a legal reform 
agenda at an early stage of a technology’s development.  In 
particular, it helps with advance thinking about the legal 
problems that might arise once a new technology diffuses 
throughout society. 
Ironically, one of the greatest benefits in understanding 
the contexts in which technological change generates legal 
problems is to avoid exaggerating the dilemmas posed by new 
technologies.  Over-emphasis on the technological angle in 
discussing legal and social problems is evident in various 
contexts.  James Boyle described how journalists sought his 
comment on the “Internet angle” for ordinary crimes that 
 17. Bennett Moses, supra note 9, at 517. 
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happened to involve a website or email.18  He gives the 
example of a murderer using an email to get a victim to turn 
up somewhere—one would not emphasize the technological 
link had an older technology (say, a telephone) been used.  
Similar problems arise in evaluating technology’s impact on 
society.  For example, it seems more plausible to conclude that 
the Internet (on average) causes depression than to say that 
conversation, on average, has the same effect (even if, 
statistically, that were true).19  Judges occasionally fall into 
the same trap of assuming that because events took place on 
the Internet, the law must be different.20  Despite occasional 
statements that some new technology changes everything,21 
legal problems stemming from technological change are 
relatively rare and quite specific.  Most of the time, a law pre-
dating technological change will apply in the new 
circumstances without any confusion.  For example, traffic 
rules continue to apply to cars with electric windows, and no 
sane person would seek to challenge these laws as inapplicable 
or write an article calling for the law to be clarified.  A 
Massachusetts court had little difficulty deciding that a name 
typed at the end of an email could be a signature, as it was 
directly analogous to a typed name at the end of a telegram, 
which had already been accepted as a signature in earlier 
cases.22  Suggestions that law is unable to keep up in a race 
against technology or that law does not apply to a new 
technology such as the Internet overstate the extent of the 
problem.23  Understanding the circumstances in which 
technological change does create legal problems highlights the 
fact that many legal problems are technology-independent.  It 
 18. James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty and 
Hard-Wired Sensors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997). 
 19. Sherry Turkle, “Spinning” Technology: What We Are Not Thinking 
About When We Are Thinking About Computers, in TECHNOLOGICAL VISIONS: 
THE HOPES AND FEARS THAT SHAPE NEW TECHNOLOGIES 19, 22 (Marita 
Sturken et al. eds., 2004). 
 20. E.g., Macquarie Bank v. Berg, 1999 Austl. Def. Rep. 53-035 (Sup. Ct. 
N.S. Wales 1999) (refusing to grant an injunction to restrain defamation 
because of concerns about variation in defamation laws across jurisdictions). 
 21. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise 
of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (arguing that new rules 
will emerge to govern within cyberspace a wide range of new phenomena that 
have no parallel in the non-virtual world). 
 22. Shattuck v. Klotzbach, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 360 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2001). 
 23. See Bennett Moses, supra note 9, at 515-517. Cf. Johnson & Post, 
supra note 21 (in relation to the Internet). 
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ith respect to different 
tech
also confirms that, even though problems associated with new 
technologies seem new, problems of the same type have arisen 
previously in relation to technologies no longer perceived as 
“new.”  Observing techno-legal debates of the past helps 
defuse the hyperbole of such debates in the present.24 
In addition to constructing a broad classification scheme 
about the types of legal problems generated by technological 
change, it is possible to use a generalized approach to address 
some common questions.  Assume, for example, that a 
regulatory scheme is proposed to resolve a conflict between a 
new technology and certain traditional values.  Gaia Bernstein 
has employed non-legal theories of technology, namely 
theories as to the social shaping of technology and the 
diffusion process, to draw some general conclusions about the 
optimum timing of regulatory intervention in technology 
design.25  She suggests that certain indicators of a 
technology’s diffusion may enhance the urgency of 
intervention.  At the same time, the relatively slow pace with 
which legislatures are able to respond to instabilities 
generated by ongoing technological change can make 
legislative intervention at an early stage of technological 
development undesirable.26  It is therefore possible to debate 
questions as to the best timing and source of regulatory 
intervention at a generalized level, and we can learn 
something from decisions made w
nologies in the past. 
If law and technology were no more than a series of 
discussions about particular legal problems whose only 
connection is the fact that they involve a new gadget or 
technique, then “law and technology” amounts to no more than 
                                                          
 24. Cf. Marita Sturken & Douglas Thomas, Introduction: Technological 
Visions and the Rhetoric of the New, in TECHNOLOGICAL VISIONS: THE HOPES 
AND FEARS THAT SHAPE NEW TECHNOLOGIES 1, 6 (Marita Sturken et al., eds., 
onstitution 
ar. 2, 1968, reprinted in 
I
9, at 577-580. 
2004) (arguing the importance of historical framing for understanding the 
relatively limited impact of technology on society). 
 25. Gaia Bernstein, When New Technologies are Still New: Windows of 
Opportunity for Privacy Protection, 51 VILL. L. REV. 921 (2006); Gaia 
Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discrimination 
and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 243 (2006); see also Langdon Winner, 
Do Artifacts Have Politics, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE (Albert H. Teich 
ed., 10th ed. 2006) 50, 57; Wilbur H. Ferry, Must we Rewrite the C
to Control Technology?, SATURDAY REVIEW, M
R CHARD C. DORF, TECHNOLOGY SOCIETY AND MAN 15, 18 (1974). 
 26. Bennett Moses, supra note 
MOSES L. Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological Change? MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
2007;8(2):589-606. 
598 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 8:2 
 
nsequences of past legal responses to 
technological change. 
legal reform from the specific 
angle of technological change. 
A. L
out technology simply 
because it is an object of fascination.30 
                                                          
 
the law of the horse.27  If, however, law and technology can be 
thought of as a series of related problems that law frequently 
confronts in situations where technology changes, then the 
focus on law and technology as an area of study is justified. 
Recognizing the similarities between problems arising in 
different technological contexts creates the possibility of 
learning from the co
IV. ZOOMING IN ON TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
It is not enough to demonstrate that broadening one’s 
perspective to examine the relationship between law and 
technological change yields useful insights.  It is also 
necessary to prove that one’s focus is not unnecessarily 
narrow.  Technological change is only one of many motivations 
for legal reform.  Nothing thus far explains why this Article 
could not as easily been written about legal problems arising 
from any improvement in human knowledge, or indeed any 
social change.  This section will argue that there are benefits 
to looking at the problem of 
AW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
Technological change is one type of social change.  If social 
change is a change in what people think and do, technological 
change is a change in what they are technically capable of 
doing.  The two are closely related.  Philosophers and 
sociologists have frequently commented on the extent to which 
technology (understood in its broadest sense) pervades our 
lives and thinking.28  Both excitement and fear of technology’s 
potential can be seen in our media and popular culture.29  To 
some extent, legal scholars write ab
 CAPITALISM 181-82 (Talcott Parsons trans., Sribner 1958); 
AND THER SSAYS
ee Barton Beebe, Law’s Empire and the Final Frontier: Legalizing 
 27. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996). 
 28. E.g., ELLUL, supra note 7; MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND 
THE SPIRIT OF
Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, in THE QUESTION 
CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY O E  3 (William Lovitt trans., 
1977). 
 29. Kieran Tranter, Terror in the Texts: Technology – Law – Future, 13 
LAW & CRITIQUE 75 (2002). 
 30. S
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But our fears about technology’s potential also create a 
felt need for control through law.  Where particular 
technologies evoke a strong response, as in the case of human 
reproductive cloning, society’s concern may lead to a ban.31  
Even where the benefits are felt to outweigh the harms, as in 
the case of in vitro fertilization, there is sometimes a felt need 
for law to operate as a “limit,” so as to allay public anxiety.32  
The idea of government control of technology is certainly more 
popular than the notion of government control over social life 
generally. The reasons for prohibiting or regulating new 
technologies are to some extent special. 
It is not only in the area of regulation that technology 
raises unique issues.  Technological change has an impact on 
existing legal rules—enhancing uncertainty, making them 
over-inclusive or under-inclusive, and rendering them 
obsolete.  Although changes in what people do, as well as 
changes in their capacities, have the potential to raise these 
same issues, most social change has less of an impact on law 
than technological change.  Technological change is usually 
more difficult to foresee at the time a law is drafted.  Of 
course, a lawmaker might choose to ignore future possibilities 
or seek to suppress them; for example, a lawmaker might wish 
to restrict work on Sundays despite the fact that religious 
diversity in his society is increasing.  A lawmaker might not 
have the time to craft laws that can deal with every 
hypothetical.  Nevertheless, a lawmaker is less likely to be 
caught by surprise by mere changes in behavior.  The fact that 
most behavioral change is gradual, and is often subject to a 
counter-trend, means that debates around law and social 
change can be distinguished from the reaction to technological 
change. 
The special relationship between legal problems and 
technological change can be seen by examining the timing of 
legal problems arising from a combination of technological and 
behavioral changes.  Changes in techniques of reproduction 
                                                          
the Future in the Early Corpus Juris Spatialis, 108 YALE L.J. 1737 (1999) 
(suggesting that “space law” reflected a desire to increase the extent of law’s 
empire). 
 31. See, e.g., CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24185 (West 2006) 
(prohibiting human cloning). 
 32. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN 
FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY, July 1984, cmnd. 9314; Janet Gallagher, 
Embryos, Eggs and Fetuses: Anxiety and the Law, in REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE 139, 147 (Michelle 
Stanworth ed., 1987). 
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prob
                                                          
 
(such as artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization) will 
usually be faster than related changes in social attitudes 
towards reproduction.33  Laws may be needed to control a type 
of activity (such as human reproductive cloning) well before it 
becomes accepted socially, if it ever does.  Other legal 
problems, such as uncertainty, over-inclusiveness, and under-
inclusiveness, are likely to affect early users of a new 
technology.  In the context of in vitro fertilization, the first 
case considering the consequences of harming an embryo arose 
from conduct in 1973, about five years before the first child 
conceived in vitro was born.34  Early cases dealing with the 
nature of railroads within the law of property and contract 
arose well before railroads became a regular means of 
transporting persons and goods.35  The potential for legal 
problems from technological change comes before full social 
acceptance, diffusion of the technology, and the resulting 
social impact.  Legal problems associated with technological 
change are thus more urgent and more difficult to anticipate 
than legal problems associated with social change.  Of course, 
once a tech
lems associated with that technology become more 
important. 
The fact that technological change poses special problems 
is reflected in metaphors of the law’s failure to keep up with 
technology.36  While technological change is not as sudden as 
might be imagined (it takes time to move a new product or 
process from development to invention to innovation to 
dissemination), it is usually speedier than social change and 
thus prompts more urgent calls for the law to “catch up.”  
Judges usually feel more comfortable updating the law in light 
of technological change as compared to social change, perhaps 
because it is more easily perceived as objective.37  While some 
social changes, such as an outbreak of war or disease, can be 
as sudden as technological change, they raise very different 
 33. See Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: 
A Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035 (2002). 
 34. Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital, No. 74 Civ. 3588, 1978 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14450 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978). 
 35. See supra note 14. 
 36. See Bennett Moses, supra note 9, at 515-517. 
 37. Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change and 
Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the 
Court, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 976, 1009 (1997). 
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er legal responses to technological change 
sepa
 justified on the basis of the fact of social change, 
but rather on the basis of general principles such as justice 
e of 
inqu
(and quite specific) legal issues.  These differences make it 
worthwhile to consid
rately from the broader topic of legal responses to 
behavioral change. 
Changes in behavior are not the only example of social 
change—there are also shifts in social and cultural beliefs and 
practices.  Although such shifts can create pressure for legal 
reform, like behavioral change, they tend to be more gradual.  
Attitudes towards legal reform of this type are also different.  
The shifts prompted by the women’s and civil rights 
movements are reflected in the repeal of discriminatory laws 
and the enactment of laws prohibiting certain forms of 
discrimination.  However, unlike technological change, 
reformers rarely argue that the law had ceased to be good law 
because of social change.  Instead, they usually argue that the 
law was always bad and all that has changed is the social 
awareness of how bad it was.  For example, few would argue 
today that the legal subordination of African-Americans was 
ever justified.  Legal responses to technological change are not 
perceived in the same way.  Few would suggest that laws 
regulating railroads were desirable before any track was laid, 
or that uncertainties regarding the identification of the 
mother of a child conceived in vitro needed to be resolved 
before the separation of gestational and genetic motherhood 
became a technical possibility.  Therefore, although changes in 
belief, like technological changes, generate reasons to change 
the law, the reasons are of a different type.  Changes in the 
law are rarely
and fairness. 
B. LAW AND CHANGES IN KNOWLEDGE 
Another way in which a theory of law and technological 
change could be broadened would be to include all changes in 
social knowledge.  Knowing how to achieve particular ends 
through technological means is but one type of knowledge.  
There are various other forms of social knowledge, including 
information about current events and scientific knowledge.  
Like technology, social knowledge evolves over time as new 
things are learned and outdated or erroneous notions are 
discarded.  It is therefore arguable that limiting the scop
iry to changes in one type of knowledge (knowledge of 
means to extend human capability) is arbitrarily narrow. 
Just as technological change can render legal rules 
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result of 
tech
resources to futurist predictions of technological change, such 
efforts are unlikely to prove fruitful.44  Therefore, 
 
uncertain, over-inclusive, under-inclusive, or obsolete, so can 
acquiring new information.  In particular, rules may become 
obsolete once it is discovered that they were based on false 
assumptions.38  It is easy to imagine ordinary instructions 
that one might wish to retract had one known all the facts.  
Some familiar ones include: “drop everything and come here” 
addressed to a person holding a baby in the bath,39 “shut the 
door” spoken by a superior who did not see the CEO 
approaching,40 and “buy a packet of curry powder” where the 
speaker did not realize that the price had recently escalated 
significantly.41  These examples suggest that there is nothing 
special about the legal problems that arise as a 
nological change—all changes in available information 
may create incentives for lawmakers to reform laws. 
But there is an important difference between rules based 
on outdated technology and rules based on partial ignorance of 
circumstances.  In formulating legal rules, legislators and 
administrators42 have the option to devote significant 
resources to ascertaining the truth of the facts on which the 
new rules are based.43  While they might devote similar 
                                                          
 38. See Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of 
tatutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561, 569 (1989). 
e Determinate?, 38 U.C.L.A. L. 
as different features to 
from lobbyists, congressional and committee staffs, 
Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 
357, 374 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1997). 
 39. Anthony D’Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial 
Interpretation of S
 40. Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can  b
ER V. 1, 8 (1990). 
 41. Alexander, supra note 38, at 376-77. 
 42. Judges do not “formulate” rules in the same way. The interaction 
between judge-made rules and technological change h
the interaction between legislative rules and technological change. See 
generally Bennett Moses, supra note 9, at 606-07. 
 43. See Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the 
Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 578 (1994) (noting that 
legislatures have “substantial staff, funds, time and procedures to devote to 
effective information gathering and sorting”). Congress, in particular, can 
gather information 
legislative hearings, and reports of the Congressional Research Service of the 
Library of Congress. 
 44. David E. Nye, Technological Prediction: A Promethean Problem, in 
TECHNOLOGICAL VISIONS: THE HOPES AND FEARS THAT SHAPE NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES 159, 161 (Marita Sturken et al. eds., 2004) (referring to a 
study demonstrating the common failure of technology predictions made by 
experts); ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 191 (1970) (giving examples of 
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technological change is likely to have a more significant 
impact on law than acquiring additional information on the 
current state of affairs.  If Congress was to pass a law based 
on mistaken facts, obviously that law could be criticized 
accordingly, but laws based on mistakes as to existing 
circumstances are relatively rare.  Laws based on mistakes as 
to existing circumstances also give rise to a different type of 
critique—lawmakers that misconstrue the facts might be 
thought careless, but lawmakers are not criticized for failing 
to anticipate technological change, only for failing to respond 
promptly after the change has taken place. 
Changes in scientific understandings are, however, 
generally considered as difficult to foresee as changes in 
technology.  Our understanding and perceptions of the natural 
world change over time, often in revolutionary ways.45  
Scientific and technological changes are closely related and 
sometimes hard to differentiate.46  For instance, 
improvements in our understanding of biology, and in 
particular the process of fertilization, facilitated the invention 
of in vitro fertilization and other reproductive technologies.  
Conversely, most scientific experiments could not take place 
without the tools created by technologists.47 
Nevertheless, the types of legal problems that are most 
closely related to changes in scientific understanding differ 
from the types of legal problems generated by technological 
change.  Changes in our understanding of the world may alter 
policy focus (for example, by altering our understandings of 
what causes both advantages and harm); changes in 
technology alter what forms of conduct are practicable (thus 
changing how we might cause advantages or harm).  Scientific 
change can shift the meaning and usefulness of categories, 
altering the utility of distinctions made in legal rules.48  In the 
TAN.  EV  
MacKenzie & Judy Wacjman, Introductory Essay, in THE 
O PING OF TECHNOLOGY 1, 9 (Donald MacKenzie & Judy Wacjman 
d
dramatic failures of technology prediction); Eugene Volokh, Book Review, 
Technology and the Future of Law, 47 S L. R . 1375, 1375-76 (1995). 
 45. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996). 
 46. See Donald 
S CIAL SHA
e s., 1st  ed. 1985). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Mark D Janis & Stephen Smith, Obsolescence in Intellectual Property 
Regimes 1,10-11 (Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 05-48, University of 
Iowa 2006) (suggesting that plant variety protection is obsolescent as it 
distinguishes plant varieties based on phenotype rather than genotype), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=897728; see also David O. Brink, Legal 
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case of technological change, the difficulty tends to be the 
inclusion or exclusion of a new form of conduct from a 
particular category, rather than the coherence of the category 
itself. 
The distinctions between the nature of legal problems 
generated by technological and scientific change are not only 
technical, but have important practical implications, as well.  
We can talk about technology-neutral rules, meaning either 
rules that do not arbitrarily distinguish between different 
means of achieving the same outcome or rules that are 
resistant to the sorts of problems generated by technological 
change.49  An understanding of the nature of legal problems 
that result from technological change can help explain what 
technology-neutral drafting involves.  Yet one does not hear 
demands for scientifically-neutral rules.  This is not because 
one cannot imagine a rule that failed to differentiate between 
scientific possibilities.  The rule “do not do anything that 
harms the environment,” leaves an interpreter to decide 
whether the manufacture of certain substances, thought by 
some to promote global warming, would be prohibited.  The 
reason is rather that scientific neutrality offers less social 
benefits than technological neutrality.  It is one thing for the 
government to say, “here is what we wish to achieve, do so in 
any way you can” and for it to remain neutral on knowledge 
claims.  Technological neutrality seeks to encourage positive 
technological change by at least remaining neutral to the 
possibility of new ways of achieving the same ends.  It is 
extremely unlikely that scientific neutrality would lead to 
better science.50  Rules tend to be based on both current 
understandings and existing possibilities, but not in the same 
way, and not with the same implications. 
One final category of knowledge needs to be distinguished 
from technology.  There are unusual cases where knowledge 
                                                          
Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 
128-29 (1988) (noting that a rule maker may use broad language but have in 
mind a particular example which, due to changes in scientific understanding, 
no longer fits into the original category). 
 49. A search on LexisNexis on June 11, 2006 in the category of U.S. and 
Canadian Law Reviews for “technolog! w/2 neutral” found 506 articles, of 
which exactly 100 used those terms in a different context.  No articles were 
found on scientifically neutral rules. 
 50. In fact, the opposite is more likely the case, as researchers employed 
by regulated corporations would be encouraged to reach “desirable” 
conclusions. 
MOSES L. Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological Change? MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
2007;8(2):589-606. 
2007] WHY HAVE A THEORY OF LAW & TECH. CHANGE? 605 
al 
issu
 
technological change will not necessarily apply more broadly. 
                                        
changes what is possible in a society, without technological 
change.  For example, the discovery of a previously unknown 
land mass by a group of people makes colonization possible 
(provided the means of getting there already exist).  Some of 
the legal controversies generated by these situations are 
similar to those generated by technological change.  However, 
the creation of a new jurisdiction involves many unique leg
es, and ought therefore to be considered independently. 
Changes in different types of knowledge—technical know-
how, information on events, scientific understanding, and 
discovery of new places—generate very different types of legal 
issues.  Thus the insights gained from a study of legal and
V. CONCLUSION 
A theory of law and technology can provide useful insights 
that assist in examining legal problems surrounding the 
introduction of particular technologies.  It provides a structure 
through which lessons learned from technologies of the past 
can help make decisions about how to regulate and adapt to 
future technologies.  It also provides a vehicle for learning 
from the vast literature on technology written by sociologists, 
historians, and philosophers.  For example, it is commonly 
accepted that technology is shaped by social and political 
structures.51  Yet critics of technology often complain about 
society’s failure to subject technology to sufficient scrutiny, in 
particular, in light of its power to alter social relations and 
social values.52  Although the frequent adoption of 
technologies despite negative externalities may support such 
theories, the notion of a mindless mass population accepting 
technology without thought is often overstated.53  A deeper 
problem is the difficulty in translating popular concerns into 
                  
nology: Structural Considerations, 
es 
l
c: The Discourses of Concern, 31 SCI., TECH. & 
U
 51. See WIEBE E. BIJKER, OF BICYCLES, BAKELITES, AND BULBS: 
TOWARDS A THEORY OF SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE (1995); THE SOCIAL 
SHAPING OF TECHNOLOGY: HOW THE REFRIGERATOR GOT ITS HUM (D 
MacKenzie & J. Wajcman, eds., 2d ed. 1999); Hans K. Klein & Daniel Lee 
Kleinman, The Social Construction of Tech
27 SCI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 28 (2002). 
 52. Ellen Rose, The Errors of Thamus: An Analysis of Technology 
Critique 23 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC. 147, 150 (2003) (discussing Jacqu
E lul, Neil Postman, Lewis Mumford, David Noble, and Ursula Franklin). 
 53. Id. at 151-155; see also Jesper Lassen & Andrew Jamison, Genetic 
Technologies Meet the Publi
H M. VALUES 8 (2006). 
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discourses on technology and society could help 
fill this gap. 
                                                          
 
policy responses.54  The interaction between a government’s 
technological policies (its attempts to regulate and facilitate 
new technologies) and the concrete politics of designing 
technologies remains poorly understood.55  The introduction of 
lawyers into 
 54. Lassen & Jamison, supra note 53, at 27. 
 55. See Knut H. Sørensen, Cultural Politics of Technology: Combining 
Critical and Constructive Interventions, 29 SCI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 184, 
187 (2004) (noting the distinction between technological policies and politics). 
